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Abstract 
The relationship between executive pay and corporate financial performance continues to attract wide 
academic, media and policy attention. The very high salaries enjoyed by senior executives in corporations in 
the US are often contrasted with the relatively low pay received by executives in Europe and Asia. Empirical 
research on executive pay has mainly concentrated on the pay-performance relationship. Although the adopted 
data sets were very different within and across countries, the results are very similar and show very low pay-
for-performance elasticities. Despite the similar results, several methodological issues are still uncovered. 
Almost all studies assume linear or semi-log linear pay functions without applying a test of the adequate 
functional form. Most models do not allow for variations across corporations, industries, countries and time. 
It it assumed that pay functions are homogeneous across corporations, variations are captured by the fixed 
effects in the constants and assumption about the errors. The purpose of the paper is to circumvent these 
possible misspecifications by adopting an explorative data analysis using nonparametric methods which impose 
rather weak restrictions on the model. We start with the most general model but use methods that allow for a 
stepwise closer look by specifying the various objectives of investigation or the model we deduce from the 
previous results. In particular, we study heterogeneity between various industry groups. The results show 
quite clearly that all this methodological issues matter empirically, e.g. industry effects are important, 
assumptions of additivity crucial and nonlinearities strong and leads to underestimations of the elasticities in a 
standard parametric model. In sum, the results might have far reaching implications for further empirical 
studies on executive pay. At least, it weakens the concern expressed by many in that field that strong pay-for-
performance incentives for executives are missing. 
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1 Introduction 
The relationship between executive pay and corporate financial performance continues to 
attract wide academic, media and policy attention.2 The very high salaries enjoyed by se-
nior executives in corporations primarily in the Northern America are often contrasted with 
the relatively low pay received by executives in Europe and Asia. The stark differences in 
executive pay across some economies becomes an issue particularly in transatlantic mergers, 
like in the case of Daimler-Benz/Chrysler, BP / Amoco and Deutsche Bank/Bankers Trust. 
Despite the fascination with executive pay issues there is little academic research compar-
ing executive pay across economies which can be used to design efficient transnational pay 
structures. As an exception see the international comparison by Conyon and Schwalbach 
(1999). 
Standard academic research is based on agency theoretical assumptions that incentive con-
tracts are characterized by asymmetric information between owners (and their representa-
tives) and executives. The owners of the corporation have incomplete information about the 
effort of the executives to maximize the long-term value of the corporation. To align owners' 
with executives' interest, agency theory suggested to design a contract in which executive 
pay is tied to observed corporate performance. In standard contracts, executives receive a 
fixed income and performance-related pay. The proportion of fixed and variable pay depends 
on the executives' degree of risk and effort aversion as well as on firm and industry specific 
factors. 
Empirical research on executive pay has mainly concentrated on the pay-performance rela-
tionship. Although the adopted data sets were very different within and across countries, 
the results are very similar and show very low pay-for-performance elasticities. Estimates 
vary between 0.1 and 0.15 for the United States, about 0.01 for Japan and about 0.06 for 
Germany, see the surveys by Murphy (1998), Schwalbach and GraBhoff (1997) or GraBhoff 
and Schwalbach (1997). This low estimates led some researchers to believe that the lack 
of strong pay-for-performance relationship reveal that most executive contracts are not in-
centive compatible, see for instance Jensen and Murphy (1990) and for the opposite view 
GraBhoff and Schwalbach (1999). 
In contrast to the low pay-for-performance elasticities, empirical results show anonymously 
that executive pay is strongly influenced by firm size and industry effects. The pay-for-firm 
size elasticities varied within the magnitude of about 0.18 to 0.3 whereas the industry effects 
can lead to pay levels in so~e industry which can be 300 percent higher than in the industry 
wi th the lowest pay levels.3 
Despite the similar results across very different data sets, several methodological issues are 
still uncovered. Almost all studies assume linear or semi-log linear pay functions without 
applying a test of the adequate functional form. Furthermore, most models do not allow for 
variations across corporations, industries, countries and time. It it assumed that pay func-
2For a most recent survey of the literature, see Murphy (1998). 
3See for instance Murphy (1998) and GraJ3hofI and Schwalbach (1997). 
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tions are homogeneous across corporations and variations are captured by the fixed effects 
in the constants and by the assumption about the errors. The methodological deficiencies 
in the executive pay studies might also be a cause for the surprisingly similar results across 
very different data sets. 
The purpose of the paper is to circumvent these difficulties of possible misspecification by 
adopting an explorative data analysis that uses non parametric methods which impose rather 
weak restrictions on the model. Additionally, since they estimate the functions locally, 
the estimated general functional form or curvature does not get affected by outliers in the 
horizontal direction. Applying smoothing methods we can start with the most general model 
to get first an idea of what the data tell us. Our methods allow then for a stepwise closer 
look by specifying the various objectives of investigation or the model we deduce from the 
previous results. 
Finally, non parametric regression analysis will be applied to detect possible heterogeneity 
between sample subgroups. In particular, we study the pay function for various industry 
groups and expect that pay functions vary across industries and do not support the homo-
geneity assumption by parametric regression analysis. 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section the standard analysis of executive pay 
studies is reviewed. In section 3, the data base will be described. Section 4 presents results 
from parametric regressions as a benchmark for the nonparametric regression analysis which 
will be explained in section 5. 
2 The Standard Empirical Model 
In analyzing executive pay the standard empirical model contains corporate size and financial 
performance as determinants of pay. Corporate size is a measure of managerial discretion and 
financial performance is an indicator for managerial incentive compatibility. Both hypoth-
esis are derived from agency theory as explained above. Basically, two types of regression 
equations are assumed: 
(1) 
(2) 
where Cit stands for executive pay, ~t reflects measures of financial performance and Sit 
represents size for firm i at time t. The termSCit are the stochastic error terms whereas the 
parameters Gi are mostly modeled as firm-specific fixed effects. In the first equation linearity 
is assumed and pay is determined by ex-post firm-specific measures with a time-lag of one 
year. The second equation is semi-log linear with no time-lag. In the previous empirical 
studies there is no rigorous statistical test to legitimize the linearity or semi-log linearity 
of the equations, see Rosen (1992). Most studies are based on the second equation and 
therefore we will concentrate our analysis on model (2). 
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Empirical models based on an equation of the form given in (2) usually employ panel data 
sets consisting of observations for the relevant variables by a sample of i = 1, ... , N firms over 
a time horizon of t = 1, ... , T years. In most data sets the number of available N firms is 
considerably larger than the length of the times series which may cause two problems. First, 
if for example one is interested in dealing with different firm-specific behavior, estimation for 
individual parameters by time series methods could be inefficient. Supposing that the slopes 
are homogeneous across firms leads to the belief that all individual variation is captured by 
the fixed effects and the assumptions about the errors. Second, for a large number N -firms 
one would expect that there might be groups of firms which may show significant different 
behavior. Therefore, the technique of pooling could be too restrictive since the estimates of 
the sensitivity parameters are usually given in some form of weighted means over individual 
effects and possible group effects are smoothed and therefore undetected. 
In this paper we impose variation across industry groups in equation (2) which allows to 
detect possible heterogeneity across groups in terms of different functional forms and in-
teractions between group dependent exogenous variables. Furthermore, we deal with the 
problem of outliers in the data for the independent variables, which could lead to biased 
estimates for pay sensitivities. We think that all these aspects are essential for empirical 
investigation in this context. Since we found them often neglected in empirical research in 
executive pay, it might weaken the seemingly robust but in many respects puzzling results. 
3 Data Description 
The regression analysis will be performed for j = 1, ... ,4 industry groups and equation (2) 
is extended t04: 
In cj,t = a· + j3i,t pl,t-l + 'Vi,t In Sj,t-l + d,t 
, J,t , I , , (3) 
Our data base is drawn from varies annual executive pay reports by "Kienbaum Vergii-
tungsberatung". The data contain average annual total pay (fixed and variable) by the top 
executives of German stock companies (Vorstand of Aktiengesellschaften, in short AG's) 
and 'companies of limited liabilities' (Geschaftsfiihrer of the Gesellschaft mit beschrankter 
Haftung, in short GmbH's). In total, we use data of up to 339 manufacturing firms for 
the period of 1988 to 1994. Company size is measured by the number of employees and 
corporate financial performance by the rate of return on sales (ROS). Companies are grouped 
into the following four distinct industry groups: (l)Basis industries, (2) Capital goods, 
(3) Consumer goods and (4) Food, drinks and tobacco. These industry groups contain the 
following industries in which the sample companies are operating (numb~ 'of companies in 
parenthesis for the year 1990): 
Standard descriptive statistics about the data can be found in Tables 3 to 5 in the appendix. 
Table 2 reveal that the data set consists of relatively few firms in group 3 (consumer goods) 
4The measures for independent variables predate the compensation measure to recognize that compensa-
tion contracts are written after observing values for the independent variables. 
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Group 1 
Basic Industries (109): 
chemicals / pharmaceu ticals / plastics 
iron and steel 
rubber 
mineral oil 
nQP iron ores 
cement 
Group 3 
Consumer Goods (48): 
glas and ceramics 
textiles and clothing 
Group 2 
Capital Goods (145): 
metal ware/sheet metal 
electrical industry 
vehicles 




Food, Drinks and Tobacco (37): 
breweries 
other food, drinks and tabacco 
Table 1: Industry Groups. 
and group 4 (food, drinks and tobacco) which we have to take into account when discussing 
the efficiency of regression results. Furthermore, the data set consists of an uneven distribu-
tion of small (less than 500 employees) and large (more then 50.000 employees) firms across 
industry groups within the period of 1988 to 1994. 
Table 4 provides means and medians for the executive compensation and the firm size mea-
sures for each group over the six years. One can see that the level of executive compensation 
is slightly higher in groups 1 and 2 which might be explained by the relatively high propor-
tion of large firms in that groups. Comparing values of means and medians one can observe 
significant size differences among large firms. We solve this heterogeneity problem by taking 
the logarithm of the firm size variable (see equation (3)). 
Table 5 shows that the range of the observed financial performance of the firms in the 
sample vary considerable within and across industry groups. Therefore, diagnostic analysis 
is needed to decide if there exist singular observations, which have high influence on regression 
estimation results. 
4 Parametric Regression Results 
The regression results for the cross-sectional analysis of equation (3) are summarized in Table 
2. The estimated sensitivity parameter for the firm size variable can directly be interpreted 
as the estimated size elasticity in each case. The parameter for the financial performance 
variable multiplied with the arithmetic mean in each case will represent an estimation for 
the performance elasticity at the mean. We will use the notation £ist and gJpt for the size and 
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performance elasticity in group j at time point t, so we have: 
f1l = fij,t . mean(pj,t-l) 
meaning that one percent increase in firm size will result roughly in an e:Jst increase m 
executive compensation by holding the performance variable fixed, and respectively, one 
percent increase of the performance measure at its mean will cause an gf,t percent increase 
in compensation. 
If one lookS"" at the results for group 1 (basic industries) we can see that both size and 
performance influences are estimated by positive values which are significantly different from 
zero for each of the six years. The estimated size elasticities are around 0.25 for the years 
1989-1991 then decrease in the year 1992. The estimated performance elasticities evaluated 
at the means are around 0.12 for the years 1989-1991, then decrease slightly to 0.09 for the 
next two years whereas the value for 1994 is considerably low with 0.03. 
For industry group 2 (capital goods) we obtain significant positive values for the size elastic-
ities in each year, but concerning the estimated parameters for the performance variable we 
are faced with an irregular scheme over the years. For the years 1989 and 1991 we get posi-
tive significant estimations resulting in estimated elasticities about 0.05. For the remaining 
years we obtain insignificant values which are negative for the last two years. Looking at 
the industry groups 3 (consumer goods) and 4 (food, drinks and tobacco) we can find some 
similarity meaning that some estimates are significant some are not with estimated values 
that spread considerably. 
Remembering the wide range of the values of the performance variable (ROS), it is not 
surprising to see inconsistency in the regression results. Therefore, we formed further diag-
nostics due to outlying data points in the independent variables. Let us demonstrate the 
procedure and the consequences for the results by some examples: 
Looking at the data for group 2 in year 1990 there is a firm with a ROS value of 0.7 in 
combination with a value of 1,667 for employees and a compensation value of 412, 700. We 
compute the centered leverage point values (diagonal values ofthe "hat matrix"S, see Belsley, 
Kuh and Welsch (1980)), as a measure to identify cases with unusual combinations of values 
for the independent variables and cases which may have a large impact on the regression 
model. For this firm we obtain the value 0.65. Since values which are considerably larger 
than the ratio of the number of independent and the number of observations are considered 
as crucial, we decide to classify this value as far away from the bulk of the data. We suspect 
that its influence on the regression result is over-weighted meaning that the correspondent 
value for the dependent variable, the value for compensation, determines the estimation of 
the regression line essentially. Deleting this data point of the Nj = 127 data points for 
this group and year and running a new regression we compute a positive significant value 
5With X the matrix of observations of the independent variables, the matrix X(X' X)-l X' is called the 
Hat matrix. The diagonal values of this matrix ly between 0 and 1, and the larger the value is, the greater 





1 2 3 4 
Size (In) 88_89 0,293* 0,237* 0,223* 0,309* 
ROS 4,769* 2,830* 2,005 0,628 
Elasticity 0,116 0,041 0,048 -0,002 
N 99 114 43 38 
Si~ (In) 89_90 0,249* 0,218* 0,220* 0,246* 0,236* 0,297* 0,287* 
ROS 4,966* 0,002 1,655* 1,896 4,585* 2,369* 3,675* 
Elasticity 0,116 
° 
0,0033 0,028 0,078 0,041 0,018 
N 100 127 126 51 50 40 39 
Size (In) 90_91 0,255* 0,271* 0,278* 0,266* 
ROS 5,377* 2,194* 2,881 3,825 
Elasticity 0,120 0,048 0,060 0,070 
N 109 145 48 37 
Size (In) 9L92 0,255* 0,196* 0,296* 0,292* 
ROS 5,065* 1,309 15,309* 6,199 
Elasticity 0,093 0,010 0,208 0,096 
N 102 125 39 34 
Size (In) 92_93 0,177* 0,198* 0,299* 0,260* 
ROS 6,202* 0,275 10,478* -0,444 
Elasticity 0,094 -0,004 0,088 -0,006 
N 81 100 39 27 
Size (In) 93_94 0,209* 0,198* 0,253* 0,245* 
ROS 3,850* 0,649 2,771 * 1,204 
Elasticity 0,028 -0,005 
° 
0,013 
N 90 118 42 22 
Table 2: Parametric regression results. 
different from zero. Table 2 demonstrates this issue by forming two columns for the year 
1990 for the groups 2 to 4 one giving the results for the original data, one by deleting one 
data point, who gives the highest value for the leverage criteria. By this we can state that 
outlying data points are in some cases responsible for strange regression results. 
The following non-parametric analysis will give us the tools to have a closer look on the 
relations by estimation methods which are not touched by outlying data points concerning 
the independent variables. By this we wiII focus on possible heterogeneous behavior over 
groups and time due to interaction effects between the independent variables on one side 
and due to possible different nonlinear functional forms on the other side. 
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5 Nonparametric analysis 
In this section we provide a brief overview to the nonparametric estimation methods we have 
used for the explorative analysis presented in the previous section. A more detailed descrip-
tion of the methods can be found in the Appendix 8.2. In this paper we are not interested in 
the statistical properties of these estimators, so we only briefly discuss the difference in their 
interpretation in this section. For a detailed comparison of these estimators, see Sperlich, 
Linton and ~ardle (1999). 
We start with a general multidimensional regression estimator, in particular the two dimen-
sional Nadaraya -Watson estimator and a local polynomial estimator. Then we turn to the 
problem of estimation in additive models. Therefore we first present the backfitting algo-
rithm and afterwards introduce the more recently developed marginal integration estimator. 
The two dimensional Nadaraya -Watson estimator will give us a first visual impression of the 
relations. We can realize whether there is a homogeneous behavior across groups and years 
concerning functional forms. Further we can get hints about possible interactions between 
the independent variables and by this we can decide for each group and each time point 
whether the restriction on an additive model will be reasonable. 
The backfitting algorithm is first projecting the multidimensional regression problem into 
the space of additive models. In this special subspace it is calculating the optimal regression 
fit for the underlying data, regardless whether the true model is additive or not. 
The Marginal Integration Estimator is always estimating the marginal effects of various 
inputs. This is done by integrating out the other direction (~ marginal integration). It does 
not necessarily look for the optimal fit. 
In case of non-additivity thus the backfitting is doing a kind of ANOVA decomposition and 
still provides a good regression fit, whereas the M.I.E. yields consistent estimates for the 
marginal effects but given non-additivity, their sum is not an estimate for the regression 
function. Consequently, estimation results of backfitting are closer to the corresponding 
estimates of parametric additive models. 
There exist several proposals how to test for additivity. But most of them are restricted 
on fixed alternatives, e.g. they allow for a multiplicative interaction of two explanatory 
variables. More general approaches have been suggested by Gozalo, Linton (1999) and 
Sperlich, Tj0stheim, Yang (1999). In both articles they use nonparametric estimation, testing 
and bootstrap methods and a reasonable performance can hardly be expected with (much) 
less than only hundred observations. So we have to restrict here on arguing e.g. for or against 
additivity based on certain estimation results but can not prove 95% significance. 
However, in case of only two input variables we can plot a three dimensional regression fit to 
get visually an idea of the structure. Furthermore, taking into account the above mentioned 
differences between backfitting and M.I.E., a comparison of their estimation results is also 
providing information about separability. If the estimates differ a lot, i.e. the variance 
explaining additive components (in backfitting) do not coincide with the marginal effects 
(given by M.I.E.), then obviously some interaction is present! 
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Figure 1: The 2-dimensional Nadaraya-Watson estimation for 1989/90. Plotted are the 
expected executive pay vs size (left axes) and ROS (right axes). First row: group1 and 2, 
second row: group 3 and 4. 
6 N onparametric Regression Results 
6.1 The 2-dimensional Nadaraya -Watson estimator 
To get a primary visual impression of the possible functional forms we first applied the 
multidimensional, in our case two dimensional, NW estimator. Therefore we used the quartic 
kernel with bandwidth h = 2.5 * std(x), where std(x) represents the standard deviation of 
the independent variables. 
Please notice that since our estimator is a local adaptive one, our results are not touched by 
possible outliers in the x-direction. For better presentation we show the plots over trimmed 
ranges. 
We have selected the results for two representative years, see Figures 1 and 2. Considering 
the plots over the years we can realize strong functional similarities between the industry 
groups 1 and 2 while the results for the other groups seem not to be homogeneous at all. 
Regardless the outliers we see a strong positive relation for compensation to firm size at 
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Figure 2: The 2-dimensional Nadaraya-vVatson estimation for 1990/91. Plotted are the 
expected executive pay vs size (left axes) and ROS (right axes). First row: group 1 and 2, 
second row: group 3 and 4. 
least for group 1 and 2, and a weaker one to the performance measure varying over years 
and groups. 
Further we can recognize some interaction of the independent variables especially in group 
3 and 4. This can visually be detected as follows. Imagine you cut slices parallel to the 
x-axes. If these slices indicate different functional forms within one direction separability of 
the inputs is not justified. Regarding this procedure we state additivity for group 1 and 2. 
6.2 Estimation results under additivity restrictions 
As mentioned above the backfitting procedure is at first projecting the data into the space 
of additive models and looking there for the optimal fit. For this it makes sense to apply 
this estimator even if separability is not given as stated for group 3 and 4. We only have to 
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Figure 3: Backfit and Parametric estimates for 1989/90, and for industry groups 1-4 from 
top to bottom. For the parametric case we have results for untrimmed (dashed) and trimmed 
(solid) data. For untrimmed data (dashed line) the influence is insignificant. 
6.3 Backfitting and Parametric Results 
Now we have a closer look to the additive components using the backfitting estimator, see 
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Figure 4: Backfit and Parametric estimates for year 1991/92 for industry groups 1-4 from 
top to bottom. The dashed line indicates that the estimated parameter is insignificant. 
quartic kernel and bandwidth h = (0.5, 0.6)T * std(x). 
In Figures 3 and 4 we show the nonparametric results in comparison with the parametric 
results for trimmed and untrimmed data. Again note that the results change only for the 
parametric model. In all industry groups we see clear nonlinearities for between compensa-
tion and financial performance. The low values in the parametric model only describe the 
12 
linear influence. But obviously this low values are due to functional misspecification. 
Considering the firm size influence we also detect a significant bump in the middle of the 
range in 1991/92 for groups 3 and 4. Unfortunately, we do not find an economic explanation 
for this feature but on the other hand this can be caused by interactions realized in the 
3-dimensional plots in Figures 1 and 2. 
6.4 Marginal Integration Results 
". 
Finally, we' estimate the pure marginal effects of the independent variables. We use again 
the local linear kernel smoother with quartic kernel with bandwidths h = 1.5 * std(x), 
9 = 2.5 * std(x). We present the estimation results together with 'confidence intervals' in 
forms of 2& -bands 6. 
As main result we can postulate that these estimation results are consistent with the finding 
above. First the nonlinearities of the financial performance influence are strengthened espe-
cially for groups 1 and 2. Second since the above mentioned bumps in the firm size relation 
are not existent now, we can conclude that indeed interactions are responsible. In general, 
the backfitting results differ from the estimated marginal effects substantially in groups 3 and 
4. This again supports that interaction effects definitively have to be taken into account to 
get reasonable regression results. We admit that this makes economic interpretation rather 
difficult. 
7 Conclusions 
The paper provides an explorative study for executive pay determination employing different 
nonparametric methods. In comparison with parametric methods applied in almost all stud-
ies on executive pay, the advantage of this approach is that the analysis is not restricted to 
functional forms, it does not require additivity assumptions and it is not effected by outlier 
in the data. The results show quite clearly that all this effects matter. Mainly we found: 
(1) Industry effects are important and are detected by introducing industry groups. In our 
investigation, maybe, only group 1 and 2 could be considered as one group. (2) The assump-
tion of additivity is crucial (in particular/or groups 3 and 4). For these groups, interaction 
effects between indedependent variables exist. (3) Nonlinearities are strong between exec-
utive compensation and financial performance (especially for groups 3 and 4) which lead 
to underestimations of the elasticities in a standard parametric model. In sum, the results 
might have far reaching implications for further empirical studies on executive pay. At least, 
it weakens the concern expressed by many in that field and most prominently phrased by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) that" ... the lack of strong pay-for-performance incentives for 
CEOs ... is puzzling." (p.262). 
6The smoothness in these plots, see Figure 5, is caused by the choice of large bandwidths. 
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Figure 5: Marginal Integration estimates for 1991/92 with 2 * sigma bands for industry 
groups 1-4 from top to bottom. 
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Tables for descriptive statistics and parametric regression re-
sults 
N Small firms Large firms 
Group min-max min-max (% of sample) min-max (% of sample) 
1 81-109 19-25 28-31 
2 100-145 10-16 29-34 
3 39-51 21-37 5-19 
4 22-40 41-61 3-15 
Table 3: Sample size and distribution of small and large firms, where small firm means 
number of employees lower than 500, and large firm a number of employees greater than 
50000. 
Comp. Empl. Comp. Empl. 
Group 1 2 
Mean 556 12255 538 12334 
Median 495 2045 467 2104 
Group 3 4 
Mean 500 1985 416 1582 
Median 404 1060 352 517 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for executive compensation (in thousand DM) and firm size. 
Return on sales in % 
Group 
1 2 3 4 
min -15 -36 -40 -35 
max 15 70 13 50 
mean 1.90 0.94 1.37 1.20 
median 1.73 1.56 1.22 0.95 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for financial performance of sample firms. 
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8.2 Nonparametric Regression Methods 
This section is devoted to a brief introduction to the non parametric estimation methods we 
have used for the explorative analysis presented in the sections 5 and 5. 
We start with a general multidimensional regression estimator, in particular the two dimen-
sional Nadaraya -Watson estimator and a local polynomial estimator. Then we turn to the 
problem of estimation in additive models. Therefore we first present the backfitting algo-
rithm and afterwards introduce the more recently developed marginal integration estimator. 
8.2.1 Nadaraya -Watson and local polynomial estimator 
Consider the regression problem of estimating the functional relation between a response 
variable Y E IR and its possibly multidimensional explanatory variable X E IRd, i.e. es-
timating the conditional expectation m(x) = E[YIX = x], where x is the realization of 
X. 
The underlying model is 
Y = m(X) + a(X)c 
with E(c) = 0, Var(c) = 1, c independent of X and a(·) a bounded variance function. 
Given cp(Ylx) is the conditional density of y given x, cp(x, y) the joint density and cpx(x) the 
marginal one of X, we have 
E[YIX = x] = J ycp(ylx)dy = J y ~~(:1 dy. (4) 
A nonparametric Kernel Density Estimator for cp(x, y) with bandwidths h, 9 and kernel 
function Kh (-) = h- 1 K(h- 1) is 
Thus, for the denominator of (4) we get 
and the resulting estimator for E[YIX = x] is 
with weights Whi(X) = K~:~f;). Here, CPh(X) can be replaced by ~ 2:i=l Kh(x - Xi). 
Unfortunately this estimator is biased, and choosing h ~ 00, the estimates m(x) ~ ~ 2: Yi 
for all x. To get rid at least of the bias in linear direction, we have to take into account 
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the first derivative of m. This can be done by local polynomial estimation. For the ease of 
presentation let x E JRI . Consider the Taylor expansion for sufficiently smooth functions 
m(·): 
m(t) 1 ~ m(x) + m'(x)(t - x) + m"(x)(t - X)22" 
1 + ... + m(p)(t - x)P-
p 




LP'i - f30 - f31(X i - x) - f32(X i - X)2 
i=l 
Obviously the resulting {l = ({lo, ... ,{lp)T provides us with estimates for ~m(v)(x), v 
v. 
0,1, ... ,po Here m(v) is the v'th derivative of m. 
8.2.2 Additive Models 
We consider the same regression problem as above with X E JRd, d ;::: 2. The only difference 
is that for a better interpretability and some wished theoretical properties we assume the 
underlying model to be separable, i.e. 
d 
m(x) = E(YjX) = c + L Ii(Xj ). (5) 
j=l 
We call the function IiO additive components and set for identifiability reasons 
E[Ii(Xj)] = 0 for all j = 1, ... , d. 
Please note that this centering of the Ii is no restriction since in a multidimensional regression 
model we always can only identify the relative influence of each factor j. 
8.2.3 The Backfitting Algorithm 
This estimation technique has been introduced by Buja , Hastie and Tibshirani (1989). They 
consider the following problem: 
d 
mlIllmlze E[Y - m(X)]2 s.t. m(X) = c + L h(Xj ). 
j=1 
i,From projection theory we know that there exists a unique solution for this problem with: 
E[{Y - m(X)} IX.) = 0,* I.(X.) = E [{ Y - ~ I;(X;). } IX.], for all 0:. 
A feasible algorithm to estimate these fQ non parametric ally is: 
17 
1 . ·t·al· ~ 0 ~ - I ",n 
. IllI 1 lze 'Po. = ,C = Y = n L-i=l Yi 
2. repeat for a = 1, ... , d, r = (ri, ... , rn)T 
ri = Yi - c- L Jj(Xij) 
#0. 
I. 
where S(·I·) is a smoothing operator such as the Nadaraya -Watson or the local poly-
nomial estimator, i.e. we regress r on Xo. = (X10., ... , Xno.)T at point Xio.. 
3. proceed until convergence is reached, i.e. the estimates 10. do not change significantly 
any more. 
Consistency of the backfitting estimator under weak conditions has recently been proved by 
Mammen, Linton and Nielsen (1999). 
8.2.4 The Marginal Integration Estimator 
Tis method is calculating the marginal effects of each input factor. In an additive separable 
model as (5) the marginal effects correspond to the additive functions 1;. The idea of this 
method is to pre-estimate the multi-dimensional regression surface and to integrate out the 
directions not of interest. Due to the indentifiability conditions EXa [Jo.(Xa)], EY = e we 
have for X~ = (Xl, ... , Xa- l, Xa+l, ... , X d) with the marginal density 'P~ 
Ex!!. [m(xa, Xo.)] = Ex!!. [e + ~ fj(xj) + fo.(xa)] 
#0. 
e + fa(xa) 
Replacing Ex!!. by taking the average over the observations and m(xa, XJ by an appro-
priate pre-estimate, we get the so called Marginal Integration Estimator (M.I.E.) ia(xa ) = 
~ L:f=l m(xo., Xi~). This method has first been introduced by Tj0stheim and Auestadt (1994) 
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